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An attempt to modelling revenue insurance schemes at the 
farm level by means of Positive Mathematical Programming
1 
Severini S. and Cortignani R 
 
Abstract 
Farmers face increasing income uncertainty and the debate is growing on the role of insurance 
schemes and of public support in this field. 
This paper applies a PMP modelling approach that takes into explicit consideration risk 
aversion behaviour to test its applicability to evaluating the potential impact of insurance 
schemes. This is done by introducing a revenue insurance scheme into a model developed on a 
small group of crop farms in Italy. 
The paper represents a preliminary assessment of the soundness of the proposed approach. It 
identifies some limitations that should be overcome to improve the proposed approach. Despite 
these limitations, it seems a useful tool to investigate the impact of insurance schemes and 
policy relevant parameters such as premium and coverage rates. Indeed, it permits the 
assessment of how this affects production choices, farm profitability and the impact of public 
support to reduce the net premium paid by farmers. 
 
Keywords: Insurance schemes, PMP, Farmers’ behaviour, Risk aversion. 
 
JEL classification: Q12, C61, Q18. 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Farmers are perceived to face an increasing income uncertainty. Commodity prices have 
been characterised by increasing volatility in recent years. This has been experienced also in the 
domestic EU market given that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has reduced its role in 
price stabilisation. The production risk is also expected to increase in the future because the 
current  climate  changes  may  bring  about  higher  yield  variability  due  to  the  increasing 
occurrence of extreme events and weather variability. For these reasons, the debate is growing 
on the potential role of private and of publicly funded instruments to manage farm risk. Indeed, 
space has been explicitly given by Reg.(EC) n.73/2009 where art. 70 allows Member States to 
grant financial contributions to premiums for crop, animal and plant insurance against economic 
losses.  
Because of all these elements, it seems relevant to develop evaluation approaches able to 
provide insights on management strategies to cope with risk, including insurance schemes. In 
                                                       
 
 
1 This research has been funded by the Italian Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry Policies (MIPAF) within the research program 
Agroscenari (“Scenari di adattamento dell’agricoltura italiana ai cambiamenti climatici”): www.agroscenari.it. Research unit: 
Università della Tuscia, Viterbo (Italy). Local coordinator: Prof. G. Dono. 
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order  to  do  so,  models  used  in  empirical  analysis  should  explicitly  take  into  consideration 
farmers’ risk aversion behaviour (Moschini and Hennessy, 2001). 
This  paper  applies  a  PMP  modelling  approach,  proposed  to  taking  into  explicit 
consideration risk aversion behaviour (Cortignani and Severini, 2010), in order to test whether it 
can be used to evaluate the potential impact of insurance schemes. This is done by introducing a 
revenue insurance scheme into a model developed on a small group of field crop farms located 
in Central Italy. 
The objective of the paper is to develop a preliminary attempt to assess the soundness and 
applicability of the proposed approach, to consider its strengths and weaknesses and to identify 
future  developments  needed  to  improve  it.  Indeed,  the  paper  is  presented  with  the  aim  of 
exchanging opinions with other researchers interested in the topic and to receive any critiques or 
suggestions with the aim of improving the approach. 
Despite  the  limited  scope  of  the  empirical  application,  some  very  preliminary  and 
tentatively considerations on the usefulness and drawbacks of the analysis to explore policy 
relevant questions are also derived.  
The  following  two  paragraphs  briefly  provide  some  background  information  on  the 
insurance schemes applied in agriculture and on the developed modelling approach. Paragraph 4 
presents  the  empirical  analysis  moving  from  the  description  of  the  farm  sample  to  the 
presentation of the simulation results. The last paragraph provides the conclusions of the paper. 
2.  INSURANCE SCHEMES AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES 
The most important risks affecting farmers are common to most businesses, others are 
unique to farming (EC, 2006). The most important risks in agriculture can be classified as 
(Hardaker, Huirne and Anderson, 1997): human or personal risks; asset risks; production or 
yield risk; price risk; institutional risk; financial risk. Despite this source of risk, all categories 
of  risk  have  an  effect  on  the  income  of  the  stakeholder.  Therefore,  most  of  the  strategies 
implemented by risk adverse farmers are aimed at reducing the expected variability of income. 
Once the risk has been identified and assessed in order to develop risk management strategies 
(Hardaker et al., 1997), various strategies can be used to reduce income risk at the farm level. 
However,  two  main  types  of  risk  management  strategies  are  often  identified  (EC,  2001): 
strategies concerning on-farm measures and risk sharing strategies. Participation in an insurance 
program belongs to this last type of strategies. 
Several agricultural insurance schemes exist: from the point of view of the risks covered, 
these can be classified as (EC, 2006): single-risk insurance; combined (peril) insurance; yield 
insurance; price insurance; revenue insurance; whole-farm insurance; income insurance; index 
insurance. 
Revenue  insurance  is  the  kind  of  insurance  scheme  considered  in  the  empirical 
application of the model, therefore it is worth to spend some time on it. Revenue insurance 
combines yield and price risk coverage in a single insurance product and it can be product-
specific or whole farm (EC, 2006). For example, the US Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) is Ancona - 122
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offered for the main field crops such as maize, soybeans, wheat, rice and cotton (Edwards, 
2009). This insurance could be cheaper than insuring independently price and yield, as the risk 
of a bad outcome is smaller: indeed, low yields may be compensated by high prices and vice-
versa. An insurance company can offer a revenue insurance if it is able to determine the joint 
probability distribution of price and yield (EC, 2006). 
A simple description of the Crop Revenue Coverage program is provided by Edwards 
(2009). In this program the production portion of the revenue guarantee is based on the farm 
Actual Production History (APH) that is an historic average of the actual yields. The yield 
levels used to calculate the CRC revenue guarantee range from 50% to 85% of the APH yield. 
Indemnity payment is the amount by which the revenue guarantee exceeds the actual revenue, if 
any. The revenue guarantee is the revenue calculated by multiplying the price
2 times the APH 
yield, times the chosen coverage level. The actual revenue is given by the actual harvested yield 
times the market price. 
Governments have traditionally developed public policies aimed at dealing with risk in 
agriculture  risk  management  ability  of  farmers  and  are  usually  justified  as  corrections  for 
various forms of market failures. (Cafiero et al., 2005). One set of such measures provides 
incentives  aimed  at  developing  insurance  markets  through  release  of  subsidies  to  premium 
payments as well as the provision of reinsurance, information and assurance of competition in 
the insurance industry (Cafiero et al., 2005).  
Subsidising premium payments is a very common instrument world-wide. This measure 
is justified on the grounds that the premium must be affordable, that a sufficient volume of 
insurance  contracts  must  be  underwritten  and  that  insurance  companies  have  to  find  the 
insurance product attractive enough to remain in the business. For example, in the US Federal 
Crop  Insurance  Program,  US  government  has  encouraged  farmers  enrolment  by  heavily 
subsidising premiums: for example, in 2003 subsidies paid within such program have reached $ 
2041.7 million over a total amount of premium of $ 3430.6 million or around 59% of the total 
amount of the premium received by the insurance companies (Glauber, 2004). 
The emphasis on this instrument has increased also within the Common  Agricultural 
Policy of the EU. Two instruments have been introduced that provided public support to cover 
insurance premium.  
The reform of the CMO wine, by means of Reg. (EC) n. 479/2008, has introduced the 
possibility of providing public funds for harvest insurance in order to contribute to safeguarding 
producers'  incomes  where  these  are  affected  by  natural  disasters,  adverse  climatic  events, 
diseases or pest infestations. This support for harvest insurance may be granted in the form of a 
financial Community contribution which must not exceed: 80% of the cost of the insurance 
premiums paid for by producers for insurance against losses as a result of adverse climatic 
events which can be assimilated to natural disasters; 50 % of the cost of the insurance premiums 
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paid for by producers for insurance in other cases (Art. 14 of Reg. (EC) n. 479/2008). The 
support for harvest insurance may only be granted if the insurance payments concerned do not 
compensate producers for more than 100 % of the income loss suffered. 
A broader instrument was introduced after the 2009 Health check of the CAP. Art. 68 of 
Reg. (EC) n. 73/2009 allows Member States to use up to 10% of their funds belonging to the 
first pillar to grant specific support to farmers, among others, in the form of contributions for 
crop,  animal  and  plant  insurance  premiums  (point  d).  According  to  art.  70  of  the  same 
Regulation, Member States may grant financial contributions to premiums for crop, animal and 
plant insurance against economic losses caused by adverse climatic events and animal or plant 
diseases or pest infestation. However, a financial contribution may only be granted for loss 
caused by an adverse climatic event or by an animal or plant disease or a pest infestation which 
destroys  more  than  30  %  of  the  average  annual  production  of  the  farmer
3.  The  financial 
contribution granted per farmer shall not exceed 65 % of the insurance premium due. 
However, the role of CAP in supporting the insurance scheme is expected to increase in 
the near future.  
In its recent communication on the future of the CAP, the European Commission has 
proposed that “a risk management toolkit should be included to deal more effectively with 
income uncertainties and market volatility that hamper the agricultural sector's possibility to 
invest in staying competitive. The toolkit would be made available to Member States to address 
both production and income risks, ranging from a new WTO green box compatible income 
stabilization  tool, to  strengthened  support  to insurance  instruments  and  mutual  funds” (EC, 
2010: page 11). 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
Positive  Mathematical  Programming  (PMP)  models  have  been  extensively  used  to 
evaluate  farmers’  adjustment  to  changes  in  market  and  policy  conditions.  However,  these 
models generally consider risk aversion behaviour only implicitly by means of the estimated 
cost function included in their objective function. Few Authors have gone forward proposing 
ways to explicitly consider risk aversion behaviour (Heckelei, 2002; Paris and Arfini, 2000). 
Recently,  a  way  to  explicitly  incorporate  such  behaviour  into  PMP  models  has  been 
proposed  and  empirically  tested  (Cortignani  and  Severini,  2010).  This  approach,  formally 
described in the appendix, is based on a simple expected utility framework under the uncertainty 
of activity gross margins and assuming constant absolute risk aversion coefficients (McCarl and 
Spreen,  1997).  It  has  allowed  the  development  of  PMP  models  that  consider  farmers’  risk 
preferences in an explicit way.  
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The  proposed  paper  proceeds  further  by  testing  the  use  of  this  kind  of  models  in 
evaluating the potential role of revenue insurance schemes. This is done by using a three-year 
constant sample of filed crop FADN farms located in central Italy, where durum wheat is the 
most important crop. 






where    are  the  expected  unitary  gross  margin  values;    are  the  model 
variables that refer to the land allocated to each activities in the n-th farms and t-th year;   
and   are the parameters of the quadratic cost function;  are the coefficients of absolute 
risk aversion and   the covariance matrix of the unitary gross margins. 
The parameters  , the   dual values and    are estimated by imposing the 
first-order conditions of the considered farm model taking into account exogenous information 
(i.e.  supply  elasticities)  (Heckelei,  2002).  The    has  been  calculated  by  taking  into 
consideration the variability of gross activity margins observed during a three-year period in the 
farm sample.  
The  model  with  the  insurance  scheme,  used  to  conduct  simulations,  considers  an 
insurance scheme for a single crop: in the empirical application this is durum wheat. The farmer 
pays an insurance premium and, if the unitary revenue of that crop falls below a contractual 
level,  he/she  receives  an  indemnity  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  difference  between  the 
contractual and the actual revenue level. In this case, the expected gross margin vector and 
covariance  matrix  of  gross  margins  are  recalculated  and  differ  from  the  case  without  the 
insurance scheme. 
In this first analysis, it is assumed that all farmers participate in the insurance scheme 
whenever they grow durum wheat in a sort of “compulsory participation”. It is important to 
stress  that  this  very  restrictive  hypothesis  is  motivated  by  the  objective  to  approach  the 
modelling process by gradually adding complexity. It is in our intention to try to extend the 
approach to explicitly model the participation choice as well. Despite this limitation, it is worth 
noting that the model allows the level of the farmers’ participation and the amount of premiums 
paid to vary by adjusting the area devoted to this crop. In this way, farmers can even avoid 
enrolling in the program by opting not to grow the insured crop. 
In the model with insurance, the expected values and the covariance matrix of the gross 
margins takes into account the role of the insurance scheme, considering both the indemnities 
obtained and the insurance premiums paid. Ancona - 122
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4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1.  Available dataset  
The study area is an agricultural area of central Italy in the province of Ancona (Marche). 
A sample of 27 FADN farms (constant in the period 2005-2007) specialized in cereals, oilseed 
and protein crops has been taken into consideration
4. 
 
Table 1: Share of each crop in terms of the total cropped area per year and average 
of three years (%) 
   2005  2006  2007  Average 
Oats  0.0  0.7  0.3  0.3 
Durum Wheat  63.3  49.9  64.1  59.1 
Common Wheat  0.7  0.2  0.0  0.3 
Maize  3.8  3.8  6.4  4.7 
Barley  4.1  2.6  0.7  2.5 
Sorghum  0.0  0.2  4.1  1.4 
Beans  1.8  2.0  4.4  2.7 
Peas  2.6  5.4  2.5  3.5 
Sugar beet  7.8  3.6  1.7  4.4 
Sunflower  14.4  18.9  13.8  15.7 
Other crops  1.4  12.8  2.1  5.4 
Source: Own calculation on FADN data       
 
Most of the area is cultivated to durum wheat which, on average, uses around 60% of the 
cropped area (Table 1). Other important crops are sunflower and maize.  
4.2. Simulation scenarios 
While the calibrated model relies on the assumption that the analysed insurance scheme is 
not available to the farms taken into consideration (BASELINE), all simulations refer to the 
case in which all farms producing durum wheat participate in the program. Here the definition 
of the baseline insurance simulation case (BLINS) is described first. Then, two other sets of 
simulations are described: those referring to the level of unitary premium (PREM) and those 
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Table 2: Synthesis of the simulation scenarios. 
Simulation code  Short description of the simulations. 
BLINS 
Baseline insurance simulation case. It considers full coverage (100% 
indemnity) and premium set at 198 €/ha. 
PREM 
Simulations considering different level of the premium paid by farmers: 
increases and decreases of: 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% from the 
BLINS case. 
COVE 
Simulations considering different levels of insurance coverage: full 
coverage (100%), 80%, 60% and 40% coverage levels have been 
considered. 
 
All simulations assume that an indemnity (ind) is paid to farmers whenever the level of 
unitary revenues from durum wheat is below its expected revenue level (E(rev)). This latter 
level is calculated on the basis of the weighed average of unitary revenues from all observations 




where x°(n,t)  are the amount of land devoted to durum wheat in the considered three-
year period.  
The unitary premium paid (pre) is identified on the basis of the arbitrary hypothesis that is 
needed  to ensure a  loss ratio  of  80%: the expected  total amount  of indemnities (E(TIND)) 
should  be  equal  to  80%  of  the  expected  total  amount  of  premiums  (E(TPRE))
5.  These  are 






Note that a uniform unitary premium per hectare of durum wheat (pre) is assumed to be 
applied in all farms. 
                                                       
 
 
5 Formally, the level of the premium (pre) is the one that satisfies the following rule: E(TIND) = 0.8 * E(TPRE). Note that this ex-
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The unitary revenues for durum wheat in all observations (i.e. for all n and t) are then 
recalculated introducing the insurance scheme previously described. This generates a new set of 
unitary gross margins that differs from the original one only by the gross margins of durum 
wheat. This set is then used to recalculate the variance-covariance matrix for unitary gross 
margin. Given that the insurance scheme applies only to durum wheat, the matrix differ from 
the one used in the calibration only in the elements referring to this crop. 
This procedure identifies the parameters to perform the baseline insurance simulation 
(BLINS).  
Another  set  of  simulations  analyses  the  impact  of  changing  the  level  of  the  unitary 
premium  (pre).  Moving  from  the  baseline  insurance  simulation,  simulations  are  run  taking 
several levels of the premiums into consideration. In particular, the following 10 levels have 
been considered: + and – 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% of the baseline level. 
The last set of simulations refers to different levels of coverage level (COVE). The basic 
hypothesis  retained  in  all  previously  described  simulations  is  that  the  indemnities  are  paid 




This additional set of simulations considers lower levels of coverage levels: 100%, 80%, 
60%,  40%  coverage  levels.  In  other  words,  the  farmers  receive  only  a  share  of  the  full 
indemnity.  Note  that,  to  keep  the  discussion  simple  and  to  allow  for  the  comparability  of 
simulation results, the unitary premium is kept at the level that makes the total gross margin 
with insurance equal to the one of the observed case (without insurance)
6.  
5.  ANALYSIS OF THE SIMULATION RESULTS 
As already mentioned, the empirical test has been developed mainly for testing the model 
and to demonstrate that it responds to change in some policy relevant variables. In particular, 
the empirical test considers three main aspects: a) the introduction of the considered insurance 
scheme; b) changes in the levels of the premium paid by farmers; c) decreases in the insurance 
coverage levels. 
In each simulation, as well as in the calibrated case, data on areas planted with durum 
wheat, cropping pattern, expected farm gross margins, expected indemnities and total premiums 
paid are presented. All data refer to the total of the results obtained by running the model in the 
income conditions prevailing in the three years taken into consideration (2005-2007). 
                                                       
 
 
6 The more realistic case could have been taken into consideration in which reducing the coverage level should also allow to reduce 
the level of the premium. Indeed, because decreasing the coverage level reduces the total amount of indemnities paid, the insurance 
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The introduction of the revenue insurance scheme under the conditions defined by the 
simulation scenario BLINS (taking a 100% coverage and a premium of 198 €/ha of durum 
wheat into consideration) has a negative impact on the expected unitary gross margin of these 
crops (Table 3). This is due to the fact that the expected indemnities do not fully cover the 
premium paid. However, the insurance scheme reduces the expected variability of economic 
results (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Durum wheat. Basic economic parameters. 
      BASELINE  BLINS 
Expected gross margin  (€/ha)  646  605 
Total variance of durum wheat gross 
margins  (€
2)  130,160  99,629 
Premium  (€/ha)  0  198 
Expected indemnity  (€/ha)  0  158 
Note: Data are calculated as weighted average on the whole farm sample and the 
three years. 
 
Despite this latter effect, it is not able to compensate for the reduction of expected gross 
margin:  therefore  the  introduction  of  the  insurance  (that  is  required  for  every  unit  of  land 
devoted to durum wheat) has the effect of reducing the convenience of planting durum wheat. 
Indeed, the area devoted to this crop declines from the observed condition of around 14% and it 
is replaced by other crops such as maize and other cereals (Table 4). Note that some of the 
considered farms stop producing wheat: this is the case particularly in those farms where the 
expected indemnities are relatively lower if compared with the premium. Indeed, while in the 
calibrated case 67 farms cultivated durum wheat, when the insurance was in place, only 59 
farms actually plant durum wheat. 
The introduction of the insurance scheme also has negative consequences on farm gross 
margin, at least under the considered compulsory nature of the participation in the insurance 
scheme (Table 4). On the contrary, insurance companies could have an expected amount of 
premiums higher than the expected amount of indemnities paid, obtaining a loss ratio of around 
84% (Table 4). Note that this value is higher than the one calculated ex-ante on the basis of the 
data observed in the three considered years (i.e. 80%) and on which the base line premium level 
(i.e. 198 €/ha) has been calculated. This is the result of the fact that the farmers for whom 
participation in the program is less convenient – who are also the farmers where the insurance 
companies gain the better margins, do actually reduce or even stop producing durum wheat. 
Finally,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the  reduction  of  the  farm  gross  margins  due  to  the 
introduction  of  the  insurance  scheme  is  higher  than  the  margin  obtained  by  the  insurance 
companies (i.e. the difference between the expected total amount of the premiums perceived by 
and  of  indemnities  paid  by  the  insurance  companies).  This  means  that,  even  taking  into 
consideration that the insurance companies should have to remunerate the resources (e.g. labour 
and capital) used for managing the activity, the margin remaining at the insurance companies is Ancona - 122
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not large enough to compensate for the welfare losses experienced by farmers under the specific 
conditions considered here. This suggests that the model could, at least potentially, also be used 
to verify the overall impact of the introduction of insurance schemes. 
In any case, the simulation results suggest that, under the specific simulated conditions, 
the insurance scheme is not convenient for the considered farmers and, for this reason, it there 
will be a lack of demand for insurance contracts. 
This condition can change if the level of the net premium paid by farmers is changed. In 
particular, its reduction can be achieved if the government intervenes by covering part of the 
premium subsidizing it. The results of the simulations show the level of the premium influences 
cropping  patterns  and  farm  economic  results.  An  increase  in  the  net  premium  reduces  the 
amount of land dedicated to durum wheat that is also, in this case, completely replaced by other 
crops, because no land is left idle in the considered range of increases (Table 4). For example, 
an increase of 20% in the level of the premium generates a decrease of durum wheat by another 
7% (From -13.9 to 20.3 %) (Table 4).  
 
Table  4:  Cropping  patterns  and  main  economic  results  under  the  calibrated  (no  insurance)  and 
different levels of the insurance premium. Whole sample three-year average. 
   PREM 
  
BASELINE  BLINS    
20%  40%  60%  80%  100%  -20%  -40%  -60%  -80%  -100% 
Cropping patterns:  (ha)  Percentage change from the observed values (%)                
Durum wheat  1380  -13.9  -20.3  -26.5  -32.7  -38.7  -44.6  0.6  8.1  10.7  13.1  15.2 
Maize  112  10.1  14.9  19.4  23.8  28.3  32.8  -4.4  -11.8  -9.1  -11.0  -16.6 
Other cereals  105  152.6  210.5  265.5  318.9  370.7  420.6  0.3  28.2  31.4  27.2  22.8 
Sunflower  365  0.3  1.5  2.6  4.5  7.4  10.6  -0.8  -18.5  -24.1  -27.2  -28.7 
Other industrial crops  245  8.8  15.0  21.0  26.8  32.2  37.3  -0.1  -16.6  -25.4  -31.4  -36.9 
Forage crops  30  -7.3  4.6  17.9  26.0  27.5  28.9  -0.9  -68.6  -69.3  -69.3  -69.3 
                                      
Economic results:  (€)  Percentage change from the observed values (%)                
Gross Margins  1992  -2.4  -4.7  -6.8  -8.7  -10.5  -12.1  0.0  2.9  5.9  9.0  12.1 
Premiums  0.0  235.0  260.9  280.7  294.0  301.2  302.2  219.6  177.1  120.9  61.7  0.0 
Indemnities  0.0  197.8  181.8  166.8  151.8  137.0  122.8  218.5  226.9  231.6  235.9  240.1 
Loss ratio^  0.0  84%  70%  59%  52%  46%  41%  99%  128%  192%  382%  0% 
Government grant^^  0.0  0.0  43.5  80.2  110.3  133.8  151.1  -  -  -  -  - 
^: Total expected amount of premium divided by total expected value of indemnities. Based on observed three-year data. 
 
The opposite situation occurs when the net premium is decreased, as could be the case 
when  a  public  subsidy  is  granted  to  applicants.  However,  the  impact  of  reductions  is  not 
symmetric in comparison with equivalent relative increases: for example, reducing the premium 
by 20% reduces the area devoted to durum wheat by around an additional 14% (Table 4). In 
other  words,  the  model  is  more  sensitive  to  decreases  than  to  increases  in  the  premium. 
However, the marginal impact of decreasing the premium on the durum wheat area is declining 
(Table 4).  
The increase of the premium has a clear negative affect on the farmers’ economic results 
and vice-versa (Table 4). In particular, decreasing the premium to around 20%  allows the Ancona - 122
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maintaining of the gross margin at the level observed in the calibrated case (without insurance). 
However, note that this condition occurs by means of different cropping patterns characterised 
by an area planted with durum wheat which is slightly larger than in the observed case (Table 
4). This is consistent with the idea that, for the same level of gross margin, the reduction of the 
risk related to durum wheat and generated by the insurance makes it more convenient to plant 
this crop. The premium level has been considered as baseline for the simulations referring to 
changes in the coverage level. 
Increasing the premium paid clearly increases the revenues of the insurance companies 
(total amount of premium) while reducing the total amount of indemnities paid. Therefore, these 
changes cause a considerable decrease in the loss ratio, making the activity more profitable for 
insurance companies (Table 4). The opposite happens when the premium is reduced, unless a 
public subsidy is going to cover the gap between the base line premium (198 €/ha) and the net 
premium paid by farmers. A hypothesis on the amount of subsidies to be granted in order to 
cover this gap and which considers the amount of land devoted to durum wheat is provided in 
Table 2. 
The last set of simulations refers to the decreases in the indemnity coverage. Starting 
from the case in which the farmers receive a full compensation (100% coverage), reductions in 
coverage of 20, 40 and 60% have been considered, in all cases maintaining the premium at the 
level so that the total expected gross margin with insurance is the same as in the calibrated one.  
Decreasing the coverage clearly reduces the convenience of growing durum wheat. For 
example, a coverage level of 80% (20% less than the full coverage) causes the area planted with 
durum wheat to decrease by 12.6% (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Cropping patterns and main economic results under different levels of coverage. 
Whole sample three-year average. 
      COVE 
  
BASELINE 
   100%  80%  60%  40% 
Cropping patterns:  (ha)     Percentage change from the observed values (%) 
Durum wheat  1380     0.6  -12.6  -17.8  -22.8 
Maize  112     -4.4  9.0  12.7  16.3 
Other cereals  105     0.3  141.0  187.6  232.6 
Sunflower  365     -0.8  0.1  1.1  2.0 
Other industrial crops  245     -0.1  7.1  12.7  17.5 
Forage crops  30     -0.9  -5.7  -0.6  10.1 
                    
Economic results:  (€)     Percentage change from the observed values (%) 
Gross Margins  1992     0.0  -2.0  -3.8  -5.6 
Premiums  0.0     219.6  190.8  179.5  168.5 
Indemnities  0.0     218.5  160.9  112.8  70.3 
Loss ratio^  0.0     1.0  0.8  0.6  0.4 
Government grant^^  0.0     58.1  50.5  47.5  44.6 
^: Total expected amount of premium divided by total expected value of indemnities. Based on observed three-year 
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Because the premium is kept constant, the decrease of the coverage level has a negative 
impact on farm economic results. For example, moving to a coverage level of 80% reduces the 
total expected gross margin by 2% (Table 5). Because reducing the coverage level reduces the 
total indemnities paid by the insurance companies, there are very positive consequences for 
them because the loss rate declines (Table 5). 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has used a PMP modelling approach that takes risk aversion behaviour into 
explicit consideration. This has been applied to evaluating the potential impact of introducing a 
revenue insurance scheme into a small group of field crop farms located in Central Italy. 
The analysis has several limitations which are important to mention before summarising 
its main results. 
The choice of the farmers to participate in the insurance scheme has not been modelled 
yet. However, we hope to proceed further with the modelling exercise in the near future in order 
to investigate such a policy relevant aspect. 
The modelling approach that takes risk aversion behaviour into consideration relies on a 
simplified  and  restrictive  expected  utility  framework  that  assumes  constant  absolute  risk 
aversion coefficients. As it is known, other approaches have been developed in order to take 
into account less restricting forms of risk aversion behaviour. Therefore, it will be interesting to 
investigate whether these more complex approaches could be integrated or not into the proposed 
modelling approach. 
The  empirical  test  considers  only  one  specific  type  of  insurance  scheme  and  a  very 
limited and specific sample of farms. Therefore, we hope to apply the model to other insurance 
schemes and to a larger database in order to achieve a more substantial empirical test. 
Despite these limitations, the analysis has arrived at some interesting results. The model 
has been able to investigate the impact of introducing an insurance scheme and of changing 
some policy relevant parameters such as premium and coverage rates. It can be used to assess 
how this affects production choices and the relative profitability of both farmers and insurance 
companies. Furthermore, it allows the assessment of whether a public support aimed at reducing 
the net premium paid by farmers is needed to make it convenient and to increase the level of 
enrolment into the insurance scheme. 
The results of the empirical test seem to suggest that the proposed model responds in a 
coherent way to the considered simulations. Decreasing (increasing) the level of the premium 
increases  (decreases)  the  acreage  of  durum  wheat  and  positively  (negatively)  affects  farm 
economic results. The opposite happens when the level of coverage of the insurance scheme 
decreases.  Finally,  in  the  considered  empirical  conditions,  the  analysis  suggests  that  the 
insurance scheme could not be established without public intervention aimed at covering part of 
the premium paid by farmers. 
It is possible to conclude that the proposed approach seems potentially interesting even if 
it should be better analysed and subject to further empirical tests. In particular, it is currently Ancona - 122
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affected  by  some  limitations  that  should  be  overcome  in  order  to  improve  the  approach. 
Regarding this last point, we would be pleased to receive any critical comments and suggestions 
from the participants in the seminar and readers. In this way, we hope to set the agenda for 
future research that we have to follow in the coming months. 
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APPENDIX. DESCRIPTION OF THE ESTIMATION MODEL. 
In our analysis we use the Heckelei and Wolff method (2003) extending it to explicitly 
considering  risk  aversion.  The  method  uses  the  Generalized  Maximum  Entropy  (GME) 
approach (Golan, Judge and Miller, 1996) covered by the restrictions needed to determine the 
appropriate curvature of the cost function. The GME is used frequently when the number of 
observations  is  lower  than  the  number  of  parameters  to  be  estimated  (ill-posed  problems). Ancona - 122
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However,  the  GME  can  also  be  used  in  well-posed  problems  because  it  allows  a  flexible 
incorporation of out of sample information such as supply elasticities (Heckelei, 2002). 
Considering  that  the  data  refer  to  several  years  (t  =  1,  ...,  T),  the  GME  problem  is 















where H(wt) is the level of entropy, the errors vector ( ) is re-parameterized as the 
expected value of a discrete probability distribution by defining the V support matrix and the   
probabilities vector; elasticities ( ) can be re-parameterised in the same way as the error 
terms by defining the   support matrix and the   probabilities vector7;   are the gross 
margins of each activity;   is the shadow price of land over several years; A is the technical 
coefficients matrix;   and Q are respectively the parameters associated with the linear term 
and the quadratic term of the cost function;   are the observed levels of activity in different 
years;   are the coefficients of absolute risk aversion for each farms n and   the covariance 
matrix of the gross margins8; L is the lower triangular matrix of the Cholesky decomposition. 
                                                       
 
 
7 The intuition behind the objective function is that the entropy criterion pulls towards the centre of the elasticity support range, in 
opposition to the error terms of the data constraints. The smaller the elasticity support range, the higher the penalty for deviating 
from the support centre. Consequently, the width of the support range reflects the precision of the a priori information (Heckelei 
and Wolff, 2003). 
8 Upper and lower bounds on the level of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion have been imposed. The E-V risk aversion 
coefficient equal the E-standard error risk aversion coefficient divided by twice the standard error. Because the E-standard error risk 
aversion coefficient usually ranges from 0 – 3 (MacCarl and Spreen, 1997), these values have been chosen as lower and upper 
bounds. The   has been calculated taking into consideration the variability of gross activity margins observed during the three-
year period.  
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Notice that  ,  ,   and also   are all estimated simultaneously by means of the considered 
approach. It is clear that the number of parameters to be estimated is large and, thus, that some 
a-priori exogenous information could be very useful to improve the quality of the estimates of 
so  many  parameters.  Unfortunately,  the  only  exogenous (i.e.  not available  from  the  FADN 
database) information available to develop the empirical analysis is that of the land allocation 
elasticities with respect to own gross margins.  
Equation  (7)  imposes  the  first  order  conditions  of  the  observed  activities  (Marginal 
Revenue = Marginal Cost) and (8) for those not observed (Marginal Revenue < Marginal Cost). 
The equation (9) ensures that the land allocated to different crops in each year is equal to the 
total available land. Equation (10) ensures the proper curvature of the cost function  and (11) is 
the combination between the elasticity re-parameterization ( ) with the Jacobian matrix 
that contains the partial derivates of the land demand functions  and the matrix   
is defines as the sample mean of activity gross margin (  divided by the sample 
mean of observed land allocation ( . Equations (12) and (13) relate to the probability law 
(where s is the number of support values).  
Notice that all available information covers several years and that only one cost function 
with parameters Q for all periods is estimated. The error vector ( ) can be interpreted in 
different ways: an error in the measurement of the variable, an error of the optimization process, 
a limit to achieving optimal allocation determined by specific economic circumstances or a 
combination of these factors (Heckelei and Wolff, 2003). 